freediver
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There are 2 'market based' mechanisms for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. One is to limit the quantity being 'traded' and let the market dictate the price (emissions trading schemes). The other is to set the price and let market mechanisms determine the quantity being traded.
Neither option is 'set and forget'. Both require politically driven changes over time. For trading schemes, the quantity being traded will have to be gradually reduced. The less gradual the reduction, the more the price will tend to fluctuate wildly. For tax schemes, the price will have to be increased, probably at a rate higher than inflation (though not necessarily), in order to bring about long term goals in emissions reductions.
The main advantage given for emissions trading schemes is that they put a clear and fixed limit on emissions. However, this is not what we actually want. We want emissions to go down gradually, as this will achieve our long term goals with minimum economic disruption. Furthermore, it is not the annual emissions that matter, but the cumulative emissions over the next half century or so. Getting the right level every year is not important, but the accumulated emissions over the years are. If you mandate a 5% reduction upfront, the price of electricity may skyrocket in the first year or two, then plummet back to the old price once the market adjusts and impliments cheap options for reducing emissions.
What is important over the short term is that the price of emissions does not fluctuate wildly. This would happen under an emissions trading scheme, but not with taxes. There is a strong chance that engineering and scientific advances will make it very cheap to reduce emissions over the long run. However, forcing a rapid response may see the price of electricity etc skyrocket in the short term. Even if this happens, the incentive to invest in technology to reduce emissions may not be there, as they may become worthless by the time the schemes are implimented. For a company wishing to develop or purchase technologies to reduce emissions, there may be 5 or ten year payback period. For the people making these decisions, there is a huge risk associated with the price fluctuations under trading schemes. So far, all trading schemes have seen the price of emissions plummet, so even if the price of electricity skyrockets in the short term, companies may still not invest in reducing emissions because they expect it to plummet a year or so later. Under trading schemes, financial investors speculating on the price changes will only add to the volatility of the price. This is bad for you, the consumer, bad for the economy, but gives no long term benefit to the environment. It may even make the problem worse if the public rejects the scheme completely and throws the baby (a price on emissions) out with the bathwater (cumbersome trading schemes).
In short, what matters more on an annual basis is not the rate of emissions, but that the price is steady and predictable for companies wanting to invest. What matters in the long term is the cumulative emissions. Carbon taxes get this balance right, but trading schemes do the opposite. What is often touted as the main advantage of trading schemes is actually a major flaw.
In practice, trading schemes are always modified to make them as similar as possible to a carbon tax, for example by putting a cap on the price of emissions and allowing companies to buy extra permits above the nominal allowance. The reason for this is that trading schemes are easy to sell to the public from a political perspective, because many people will stop paying attention as soon as they hear the word tax come out of a politician's mouth.
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