thegreatdivide
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As prof. Steve Keen confirms, in examining the egregious effects of the most damaging mainsteam economic dogma in the world today, namely, money can only be created in private banks, not the nation's treasury:
Triggering Crises by Reducing Government Debt.
Chapter 05 of Money and Macroeconomics from First Principles, for Elon Musk and Other Engineers
What Musk thinks will revive the economy is more likely to trigger a serious recession
The beliefs that the State faces a fiscal crisis if its debt gets too high, and that it is prudent for the government to reduce its debt by running surpluses rather than deficits, have existed since the dawn of the Republic. The empirical record of such attempts is definitive, and runs contrary to the expectations of governments at those times. A serious crisis, triggered by a private debt bubble and crash, has followed every sustained attempt to reduce government debt. This can be seen by comparing data on government and private debt back to 1834.
Sharp and sustained downturns in credit-based money creation—with credit turning strongly negative and staying so for years—occurred in 1837-1844, 1930-37 and 2007-2010. These are known respectively as the “Panic of 1837”, the Great Depression, and the Global Financial Crisis. All three crises were preceded by periods during which the government either succeeded in reducing its debt by running surpluses (the Panic of 1837 and the Great Depression), or attempted to, but was waylaid by other factors (such as the “War on Terror” which derailed the attempts by Clinton and G.W. Bush to run surpluses in the late 90s and early 2000s).
During the 1920s, President Coolidge deliberately reduced government spending each year, with the surplus averaging of 1% of GDP across the decade. His final State of the Union Address, 68F[1] on December 4th, 1928, lauded these surpluses as both the cause of the 1920s boom, and as a guarantee of continued prosperity.
<<"No Congress of the United States ever assembled … has met with a more pleasing prospect than that which appears at the present time…
Wastefulness in public business and private enterprise has been displaced by constructive economy… We have substituted for the vicious circle of increasing expenditures, increasing tax rates, and diminishing profits the charmed circle of diminishing expenditures, diminishing tax rates, and increasing profits.
Four times we have made a drastic revision of our internal revenue system… Each time the resulting stimulation to business has so increased taxable incomes and profits that a surplus has been produced. One-third of the national debt has been paid… It has been a method which has performed the seeming miracle of leaving a much greater percentage of earnings in the hands of the taxpayers 'with scarcely any diminution of the Government revenue. That is constructive economy in the highest degree. It is the corner stone of prosperity. It should not fail to be continued". {Coolidge, 1928 #6057. Emphasis added}>>
Ten months later, the Great Crash occurred, ushering in the Great Depression. While Coolidge had focused on reducing government debt, private debt, which was ignored by policy makers, rose substantially. Government surpluses of 1% of GDP, which reduced the money supply, had been offset by credit of roughly 5% of GDP, which increased it. Then credit turned strongly negative after the Great Crash, with the fall in private debt exceeding 10% of GDP in magnitude between 1930 and 1933. Despite this, the private debt to GDP ratio rose, because the fall in real output was amplified by deflation of 10% p.a., so that the fall in nominal GDP far exceeded the fall in private debt.
Irving Fisher argued that the crisis was caused by private sector deleveraging from a position of excessive private debt, coupled with deflation:
<<deflation caused by the debt reacts on the debt. Each dollar of debt still unpaid becomes a bigger dollar, and if the over-indebtedness with which we started was great enough, the liquidation of debts cannot keep up with the fall of prices which it causes.
In that case, the liquidation defeats itself. While it diminishes the number of dollars owed, it may not do so as fast, as it increases the value of each dollar owed. Then, the very effort of individuals to lessen their burden of debts increases it, because of the mass effect of the stampede to liquidate in swelling each dollar owed. Then we have the great paradox which, I submit, is the chief secret of most, if not all, great depressions: The more the debtors pay, the more they owe. {Fisher, 1933 #152`, p. 344}>>
Fisher was well aware of the importance of bank-created money in fueling both booms when it is rising, and slumps when it is falling:
<<A man-to-man debt may be paid without affecting the volume of outstanding currency, for whatever currency is paid by one, whether it be legal tender or deposit currency transferred by check, is received by the other, and is still outstanding. But when a debt to a commercial bank is paid by check out of a deposit balance, that amount of deposit currency simply disappears. {Fisher, 1932 #4878`, p. 15}>>
(cont.)
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