freediver wrote on May 13^th, 2017 at 11:11am:


I would point to things like the overthrow of a functioning parliamentary democracy in Iran... but then I remember you spinelessly apologising for it by arguing the Iranians deserved it for not offering enough of their oil to Britain.

I also referred to Kuwait.  Did the West stick its nose in there, Effendi....and then.....when Saddam was booted out of Kuwait, did we stop at the border, or did we totally destroy a Sovereign State?

FD seems to hinge his entire apology of western intervention on the expansion of the Ottoman empire into Europe some 2-3 hundred years earlier.

I don't think 1948 is a very good starting date. I would go back earlier in the century - especially during WWI when the western powers plotted the post-Ottoman future of the middle east. That was after they funded and armed the previously insignificant wahabists (who now rule Saudi Arabia) in their war against the Ottomans.

FD seems to hinge his entire apology of western intervention on the expansion of the Ottoman empire into Europe some 2-3 hundred years earlier.

polite_gandalf wrote on May 13^th, 2017 at 10:13pm:


Are the West to blame for the Saudi-Ottoman war 1811-1818, did the West fund that war?
Muslims have been fighting each other for 1400 years.

Pakistan was created in similar circumstances around the same time as Israel, did muslims ever thank the West for carving up Hindustan for muslims, more Pakistanis have died from Islamic terror since 9/11 than coalition soldiers in the war on terror.

If muslims only fight in self defence then explain the Battle Of Lepanto, was that the first defeat for the Ottoman empire?

Baronvonrort wrote on May 13^th, 2017 at 10:52pm:


I do not care how much the 'Arabs' bash themselves.  It is none of our business.

They did not involve themselves in Wars when the West were beating the crap out of each other.

The West involved them.

The concession agreements, which were the legal basis on which the oil industry was run in most oil producing countries until early 1970s, can best be summed up as an arrangement whereby a government grants exclusive rights to a company or an individual to carry out petroleum operations in a defined area for a finite period. The concessionaire bears the burden of the financial and commercial risks but acquires the right to excavate the oil and dispose of it freely in exchange for the payment of certain specified sums to the government as the owner of resources

Furthermore Dr. Moṣaddeq’s trusted and close oil advisers had convinced him that given its size and importance, the Iranian crude oil and petroleum products were irreplaceable in the international markets. Consequently, the loss of such a volume of oil would bring the Western economies to their knees, forcing them to accept the Iranian terms, and bring about the success of the nationalization. They were clearly not sufficiently informed about the development of large-scale crude oil production capacities in the neighboring countries during the postwar years, and also about the emergence of considerable excess refining capacities in Western Europe (Yeganeh, p. 62).

The oil companies also strove to increase production in the United States and in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iraq. As it turned out, the momentum of the great post-war oil development supported the British embargo against Iran, and the feared shortage never materialized. By 1952, Iranian production had plummeted to just 20,000 barrels per day, compared to 664,000 in 1950, while total world production had risen from 10.9 million barrels per day in 1950 to 13.0 million in 1952, an increase more than three times greater than Iran’s total output in 1950 (Yergin, p. 464).

During his tenure of office Dr. Moṣaddeq was presented with the following proposals for the settlement of the oil dispute:

The Jackson Mission. On 19 June 1951, The Stokes mission. On 11 August 1951, The International Bank’s Proposal,The Churchill-Truman proposals.

The management and control of the oil industry in Iran would be in the hands of the Iranians. For the first time Moṣaddeq was to be offered a settlement that did not entail foreign management and control of oil operations in Iran.

On 7 March 1953 a communiqué was issued in Washington, stating that the US government regarded the proposals of 20 February 1953 as fair and reasonable and in keeping with the principle of oil nationalization, but on the 20 March, Moṣaddeq made a broadcast speech rejecting the proposals of 20 February.

The failure of Dr. Moṣaddeq to settle the oil dispute coincided with severe deterioration of economic conditions and worsening of the internal political situation in Iran.

At that point Moṣaddeq made the great mistake of failing to realize that he had extracted all the concessions he could get. Having driven the USA and Britain to their limits, he asked for still more and precipitated his downfall, opening the way for new negotiations with Zahedi’s Government.”Given the nature of his power base, Moṣaddeq, having risen on the rallying cry of oil nationalization , was left with very little room for maneuver, unable to accept any form of compromise with AIOC and Britain, let alone to take any positive initiative to reach a settlement, without being charged with betrayal by his own supporters.

Dr. Moṣaddeq was dismissed by the Shah, but upon his resistance against the dismissal the Shah left the country. This was followed by an uprising in Tehran in favor of the Shah which led to the overthrow of Dr. Moṣaddeq’s government in August 1953, the installation of General Faẓl-Allāh Zāhedi’s government, and the return of the Shah to the country (See EIr, vol. VI, pp. 354-56). Thus the stage was set for the settlement of the Iranian oil crisis, and the conclusion of a new agreement for revival of the Iranian oil industry (Yeganeh, pp. 61-64).