lee wrote on Oct 10
th, 2016 at 6:51pm:
Auggie wrote on Oct 10
th, 2016 at 6:29pm:
Problem easily solved: reduce the power of the LegCo so that it can only delay bills instead of blocking them.
Not much of a House Of Review is it.
In fact, I believe it would be more of a House of Review than the status quo. If it's a House of 'Review' then it should only review legislation and make recommendations; not block Bills. In the current system, because both Houses of Parliament are elected by the people, both Houses can (and do) claim an equal mandate from the people. For e.g. if the Assembly passes a Bill and the Council rejects it, then whose fault is it? Whom do we blame for deadlock? Do we blame the Government, or do we blame the Legislative Council? The parliamentary system of government is known primarily for its efficiency, rather than checks and balances. The lower House contains the Government and is the House closest to the people who choose it. Therefore, I believe that the lower House should be able to pass its agenda because the people have voted that government in.
Having a weakened upper House is actually quite effective: drawing on the experience of the United Kingdom, the House of Lords can delay passage of Bills for one year. This is a significant period of time, and often disrupts the Government's agenda. In such case, the Government either has to wait one full year to pass the Bill in its original format, or consider the recommendations of the House of Lords. In practice, however, the House of Lords often passes the majority of Government Bills because disrupting the will of the popular House is very controversial and is detrimental to the institution of the House of Lords.
In the case of South Australia's Legislative Council, I would reduce the delaying time to 9 months, at which point if the Assembly repasses it, the Bill becomes a law. Second, I would remove life-time appointment, and institute a single term of 12 years for each member (they shall not be re-eligible), thereby ensuring both continuity and rotation. Third, I would restrict the size of the Council to be no greater than one-third the size of the Assembly, so that it is small and of minimal expense. Finally I would restrict the salaries of members of the Council to be no more than one-half of that given to members of the Assembly; the lower salary is designed to discourage ambitious people who covet political office, thereby placing greater emphasis on the neutrality of the Council. Overall, the expense of maintaining such a House would be significantly lower than it is currently.
The Council would be able to make recommendations and changes to the Bill, which task is in line with the 'review' aspect of the House. The expertise of community leaders, teachers and other experienced people would ensure that all legislation receives a neutral, non-political and professional review, which enhances scrutiny over legislation. And if, the Legislative Council disapproves of the Bill, which the Government is determined to pass, then after 9 months, the House of Assembly shall have the final say and will be ultimately accountable to the electorate for passing that legislation.